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Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to discuss the “human capital” approach to inference. Observed
decisions by experts can be used to organize data on their decisions using simple machine
learning techniques. The fact that the human capital of these experts is heterogeneous
implies that errors in decision making are inevitable, which in turn allows us to identify the
conditional average treatment effect for a wider class of situations than would be possible
with randomized control trials. This point is illustrated with some data from medical decision
making in the context of treating depression, heart disease, and adverse childbirth events.
“False facts are highly injurious to the progress of science, for they often
endure long; but false views, if supported by some evidence, do little harm, for
everyone takes a salutary pleasure in proving their falseness; and when this is
done, one path towards error is closed and the road to truth is often at the same
time opened.” - Charles Darwin, Descent of Man, Vol 2, Chapter 2, 1871.
1 Introduction
There are two distinct approaches to modern empirical economics. First, there is research
using structural models that begins by assuming individuals make utility maximizing de-
cisions within a well defined environment, and then proceeds to measure the value of the
unknown parameters. A classic example of this is the well known Roy (1951) model, where
we know that the model can only be identified under strong assumptions (Heckman and
Honore (1990)). The second approach addresses the self-selection of individuals into differ-
ent observed treatments or choices by either explicitly randomizing treatments/choices in
the context of an experiment (Charness and Kuhn (2011) and List and Rasul (2011)), or
through the use of a natural experiment that allows for an instrumental variables strategy
(Angrist et al. (1996) and Angrist and Krueger (1999)).
There is general agreement that explicit randomization provides one of the cleanest way
to obtain a measure of the effect of choice. It is also certainly the approach that is growing
in importance and popularity, as we can see in Table 1. Notice as well that along with the
rise in empirical research we see a corresponding fall in theory. One goal of the approach
outlined here is to consider new ways to use theory to explore data. Also, while the rise in
the use of experiments in economics is quite recent, the development of experimental tech-
niques has a long history in economic development. Some of the earliest work tackled the
problem of improving agricultural production in developed (Yates (1933); Bose and Maha-
lanobis (1938)) and developing countries (Bose and Mahalanobis (1938)). Such experiments
take a long time, and it was understood early on that one could could not rely only upon
experimental methods. For example, Mahalanobis (1944) provides a wonderful discussion of
survey techniques he developed to study agriculture in India under challenging conditions to
supplement results from field experiments.
Regardless of whether one uses an experiment or survey techniques, the goal is to measure
the effect of treatment, based upon either explicit or quasi randomization. In contrast, the
structural approach follows a more “Popperian” strategy of using theory to create a formal
model to organize the data, and then proceeds by systematic rejections of the model that
hopefully lead to subsequent improvements in the theory.1 The purpose of this essay is to
suggest a way to combine these approaches using what I call the “human capital approach
to inference.”
The approach is intended to help us learn from data sets that involve decisions by experts.
1See Popper (1963). Though it is worth emphasizing that Popper (1957) did not in fact believe that
economics could be a science! Popper’s curse is the claim that human affairs are so complex that one cannot
distinguish between good models and just so stories. See Boltanski (2014).
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In this paper I will explicitly discuss medical decision making in the treatment of depression
and heart attacks, as well as assisting in child birth. Kahneman and Klein (2009) discuss
the two contrasting view on human decision making - essentially human decision making can
be viewed has a half full and half empty glass. Gary Klein works on psychology of expert
decision, whose goal is to understand how people are able to achieve amazing performance in
so many areas. Humans carry out complex surgery, drive cars and airplanes, play complex
games – domains where we are just beginning to have computer software that is able to carry
out the task. In contrast, behavioral economics, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman, focuses on
where we mess up: the many situations where humans face apparently simple decisions, yet
make woefully poor decisions. The purpose of Kahneman and Klein (2009) is to highlight
that they are both right (which is why they can agree) – the same person can simultaneously
make both brilliant and really poor decisions.
This observation is consistent with the economist’s notion of human capital. These are
the set of productive skills that take time to acquire. Individuals with high levels of human
capital are capable of making high-quality domain-specific decisions. The fact that human
capital is expensive implies that at the margin they can always do better, and hence there
will be situations where even a highly skilled individual will make mistakes. We also know
from labor economics that in any large population there is great variety in skill level, and
hence also variation in error making.
The human capital approach to inference can be used in situations where we have a large
number of persons to be treated by skilled decision makers. If we were to do a randomized
control trial (RCT), then individuals would be randomly allocated to treatment and control,
and then we would compare the outcomes. The problem is that in many cases, particularly
in medical decision making, the optimal treatment varies with the characteristics of the
patient. For example, some individuals face adverse reactions to drugs, and others have
a natural immunity to disease, leading to heterogeneous responses to both treatment and
placebo. The potential variation is substantial, which is why physicians spend years studying
different possible conditions, and associating them with the appropriate treatment.
Let us now suppose that in addition to having a large set of patients, information on
their characteristics, treatment, and outcomes, we also have them matched to physicians,
with a large number of patients for each physician. We then proceed by using the fact that
these physicians are experts, and hence on average their treatments are helpful. Assuming
that there are only two treatment choices, A or B, we can use the decisions by the physi-
cians to organize the data by the probability that a physician chooses A for patient i with
characteristics xi. This yields a propensity score η (xi). This is a straightforward machine
learning exercise – given features xi, what is the likelihood that choice A will be made.
One approach to machine learning would be to stop at this point. Namely, use the data
to build a model of how expert physicians make choices. There is a huge literature studying
this problem.2 For example, we can view the recent work to produce self-driving cars as one
in which the machine is learning to be as good as a human at such a task. However, we can
2For example the early work on machine learning was funded by the U.S. Postal Office in an attempt to
mechanize reading addresses on letters, a task that humans could do quite well. See Mori et al. (1992).
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Table 1: Percent Distributions of Methodology of Published Articles, 1963–2011
Source: Hamermesh (2013).
do a bit more. Once we have the propensity score, then we can proceed, as in Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983), to estimate the effect of choice conditional upon the propensity score.
We differ from the standard propensity score approach in two ways. The first, is that we
are concerned with the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) - the effect of treatment
conditional upon characteristics xi. As individual characteristics change, the optimal choice
may change. The hope is that if we make a choice conditional upon the score xi, this can
result in better outcomes on average for individuals with this score.
Second, the goal of the propensity score estimator is to provide better control for observ-
able characteristics, and the endogenous selection of individuals based upon their character-
istics into treatment. In our case, since we have information on who treats, we can use the
fact that human capital is limited, and hence physicians not only make errors, vary in the
frequency with which mistakes are made. This allows use to measure the effect of treatment
conditional upon patient characteristics, or CATE, and physician identity. We can ask which
physicians get better performance, and what are the characteristics of their decisions that
achieve better outcomes. The rest of the paper fills in the details of this discussion.
The agenda is as follows. The next section briefly reviews the Rubin/Holland. Section
3 discusses the use of randomized control trials to estimate average treatment effects. The
purpose of getting a good estimate of the treatment effect is to make a better decision.
However, in many cases the average treatment effect is misleading due to large variations
of the effect on sub-populations. In many cases, particularly in medicine, the complexity of
the environment is such that randomizing over all the sub-populations of interest is simply
impossible. As Melinda Beck points out in a recent Wall Street Journal article, genetic
variation in metabolic rates can lead to large variation in response to drugs.3 In this section
data from RCT testing of anti-depression drugs is discussed to illustrate how the trials often
have little relevance for decision making in the field. In particular, this example provides
another illustration of the point that the average treatment effect is not always the most
important parameter of interest (see for example the discussions in Heckman (2010) and
3Is Your Medicine Right for Your Metabolism?, Wall Street Journal, March 14th, 2016.
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Deaton (2010)). Section 4 introduces the “human capital” approach to inference, and provides
conditions under which valid inference is possible. Section 5 discusses two applications of
this idea to heart attack treatment and whether or not to deliver a child by a C-section. The
final section has some concluding remarks.
2 The Rubin/Holland Model
In this section I review the well known Rubin-Holland model outlined by Holland (1986)
and explicitly link it to optimal decision making.4 The question is how to use evidence
from an experiment or observational data to make better decisions. I will reiterate the basic
point by Holland (1986) that doing so requires some modeling assumptions. In practice
these assumptions are typically implicit, rather than explicit, which in turn can muddy the
relationship between theory and evidence.
We begin with a universe of individuals whose characteristics are described by a compact
set X ⊂ <n. For example, this might be all persons in a country in the year 2000, or all
individuals who had a fever last year, or some other well defined set of observable features.
Individuals may also be firms or countries, though for the current discussion we can think
of them as a collection of persons denoted by:
U = {i|xi ∈ X} ,
where xi is the characteristic of individual i. Here I deviate slightly from Holland where the
primitive is typically the set U . The reason is that the external validity of any experiment is
defined by the set of persons for whom the results are valid. These individuals are typically
not listed, but described by features such as race or where they live. Notice that this
formulation includes as a special case where each person is a unique point in X.







) |i ∈ U} ,
where u1i , u0i are the outcomes for choices 1 and 0 respectively. These are potential outcomes
because the choice is made at a given date, with payoffs realized in the future, and hence for
each unit we can at best observe u1i or u0i , but not both. We are implicitly making the stable
unit treatment value assumption (STUVA) - the decision for unit j 6= i does not effect the
potential outcomes for unit i. The average treatment effect (ATE ) of choice 1 is given by:
τ (X) = E
{
u1i − u0i |i ∈ U
}
.
This is typically the parameter estimated with a randomized control trial (see Imbens and
Rubin (2011)). One procedure is as follows. We randomly select from U - the set of indi-
viduals that match the criteria in set X - 2n individuals, who are randomly assign to group
4See Imbens and Rubin (2011) for a comprehensive review of the approach and the historical background.
See also Freedman (2006).
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i |i ∈ UA ∪ UB
}
, where
di = 1 if i ∈ U1 and di = 0 otherwise. The point here is that Data(n) cannot contain both
potential outcomes for the same unit, but it can be used to compute an estimate of averge
treatment effect:











When the assignment is random (xi |= di), then we have the well known result:
Proposition 1. If units are randomly assigned to choices 1 and 0, and the stable unit
treatment value assumption is satisfied, then the average treatment effect satisfies:
τ (X) = E {τˆ (Data, n)} = limn→∞τˆ (Data (n)) .
Proof. We follow Deaton (2010). First:




E{u1i |di = 1} −
∑
i∈U0





u1i |di = 1
}− E {u0i |di = 0}
= limn→∞τˆ (Data (n))
Next observe that:
E {τˆ (Data, n)} = E {u1i |di = 1}− E {u0i |di = 0} ,
= E
{
u1i |di = 1
}− E {u0i |di = 1} ,
= E
{
u0i |di = 1
}− E {u0i |di = 0} .
Observe that by SUTVA and random assignment, we have that the final line is zero. Random
assignment also implies that the expected value of a potential outcome (observed or not) is
not affected by the assignment. Hence we have:
limn→∞τˆ (Data (n)) = E
{
u1i |di = 1
}− E {u0i |di = 1} ,
= E
{





u1i − u0i |i ∈ U
}
,
= τ (X) .
Though quite simple, this result nicely illustrates the power of RCTs - under the ap-
propriate assumptions they allow for the measurement of the average treatment effect for a
population. There is a large literature on constructing bounds to τ (X) given finite data from
an RCT. Our concern here is not with the implementation details for an RCT, but with the
problem of making decisions using observational data.
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Table 2: Sales of SSRI drugs and mood stabilizers in the US
Drug name Lexapro (Forest Laboratories) Zoloft (Pfizer) Abilify (Otsuka Pharmaceutical) Lamictal (GlaxoSmithKline)
Drug type SSRIs Mood Stabilizers
 Sales Rank Sales Rank Sales Rank Sales Rank
2003                    965,666 34                    2,580,509 5                       364,546 88                       582,281 56
2004                 1,551,230 17                    2,622,801 5                       747,400 47                       780,614 43
2005                 1,849,528 13                    2,561,069 6                    1,098,379 29                    1,031,307 34
2006                 2,098,794 10                    1,772,599 15                    1,417,106 24                    1,326,844 26
2007                 2,304,364 9                       175,209 170                    1,781,562 15                    1,717,429 17
2008                 2,412,048 11                    2,371,795 12                    1,539,101 19
2009                 2,334,422 13                    3,083,351 6                       498,599 73
2010                 2,483,391 12                    3,514,265 6                       326,331 101
2011                 2,835,216 18                    5,032,032 4
2012                    5,602,876 2
2013                    6,293,801 1
Patent expiration March 2012 June 2006 October 2014 Mid 2008
Notes: Sales in the US in $000. Source: http://www.drugs.com/top200.html
The first condition, τ (X) = E {τˆ (Data, n)}, is called the ignorability condition. It means
that regardless of the sample size, the mean is an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect.
However, this is no longer true for selected sub-samples, particularly sub-samples chosen as
a function of xi. The literature on estimating treatment effects has for the most part focused
upon the problem of inferring τ (X) as a function of different assignment mechanisms. In
many cases, as both Deaton (2010) and Heckman (2010) observe, we are also interested in
the treatment effect for sub-populations of X.
For example, consider the problem of choosing a drug for the treatment of depression.
First note that this is a very significant question. In order for a company to sell a drug they
have patented, it must go through trials with human subjects. Successful drugs provide a
great deal of revenue to companies during the life of the patent as we can see in Table 2.
Thus they have a large financial incentive to have a successful trial and use the results of
the trial to direct physicians on how to use a drug.
We can view trials as have having three outcomes, ui ∈ {V, 0,−B}, where V > 0 is to
feel well, 0 is to be depressed, and −B < 0 is to commit suicide. The target populations
are individuals who are currently depressed, denoted by XD. The goal of treatment is to
obtain the outcome ui = V . The difficulty is that in order to get approval to use human
subjects one cannot enroll patients into the study that are at high risk of suicide, but rather
the subset of patients that are depressed, but not at risk of suicide:
X¯D =
{
x ∈ XD|Pr [ui = −B|xi] ' 0
}
.
Second, one needs an instrument to measure the outcome of the trial, which is necessarily
different than the long term outcome. Such instruments are performance scores denoted
by yi. Again, one can only measure the outcome of the chosen treatment and not both
potential outcomes. The extended Rubin/Holland model is concerned with measuring both















In the case of depression, drug researchers use the Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating
Scale (MADRS), Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HAMD), or Children’s Depression








The average treatment effect is then defined by:




where the hat refers to the population means. The results from a number of studies looking
at Lexapro and Zoloft are reported in Table 3.6 The average treatment effect is reported
in the column RSR. The RRR column is computed in the same way using the fraction of
individuals whose depression rate is reduced by 40%-60%.
The decision to prescribe a drug is based upon the trials such as the ones in Table 3.
In general the point estimates are all positive. This leads practitioners to prescribe the
medication because they believe that credible RCTs suggest that they work. Yet, Ludwig
et al. (2009) observe, these results lack external validity because the target individuals must,
for ethical reasons, be excluded from the studies.7
Moreover, the outcome of these trials is an index whose value does not have an obvious
economic interpretation. That is to say, there is no obvious weighting rule that, for example,
includes the loss in value due to completed suicides; hence the average treatment effect may
not reflect the optimal choice. We also know that SSRIs may have significant side effects,
and hence any treatment effect should include values associated with illness caused by the
drug.8
The American Psychiatric Association looked at the question of how treatment affects
suicide rates. The results are shown in Table 4. As one can see for the different ages groups
the success for younger patients is definitely mixed. In particular, for younger patients these
drugs may increase the risk of suicide, and they are now packaged with “black label” warnings
to this effect. Given that by age 25 suicide has already claimed individuals, the positive effect
at that age may due in part to the selection effect of suicide!
5See Cusin et al. (2010)
6Studies looking lexapro are: Lepola et al. (2003), Wade et al. (2002), Burke et al. (2002), Pigott et al.
(2007), Azorin et al. (2003), Bech et al. (2004), Ninan et al. (2003), Llorca et al. (2005), Ventura et al. (2006),
Findling et al. (2013), Emslie et al. (2009), Wagner et al. (2006), studies of Zoloft include Ventura et al.
(2006), Stahl (2000), Fabre et al. (1995), Olie et al. (1997), Schneider et al. (2003), Wagner et al. (2003),
Donnelly et al. (2006), March et al. (1998).
7Ludwig et al. (2009) use observational data and the fact that variation in the way the drugs are priced
and distributed affects the level of SSRI usage. Using population level measures of suicide rates, they find
that an increase in the class of selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors of 1 pill per capita (12% of 2000 sales
levels) reduces suicide by 5%.
8For the FDA warnings on Zoloft and Lexapro go to http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety and search









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Suicidality from a Meta-study of RCTs by American Psychiatric Association
At the end, what we would like from these trials is to identify the set of characteristics
X+ such that τ (xi) > 0,∀xi ∈ X+. This in turn determines the optimal rule d∗i (xi) = 1 if
and only if xi ∈ X+. One way to do this is to estimate the conditional average treatment
effect (CATE):
τ ∗ (x) = E
{
u1i − u0i |xi = x
}
, (1)
this in turn directly answers the question of whether or not an individual with characteristics
xi should be treated or not. One could use an RCT for this if one could run a trial for all
values of xi ∈ X. In general that is simply impossible.
3 When is CATE better than ATE?
The previous illustrates that the ATE is not necessarily the most meaningful or important
measure, particularly when the treatment effect varies in sign across the units. Given that
the fundamental goal of many trials is to improve the quality of decision making, the purpose
of this section is to outline how the machine learning literature evaluates decision making
(here I rely heavily upon Devroye et al. (1996)). We begin by letting µ be a measure on
X describing the distribution of individual characteristics. For each x ∈ X the conditional
average treatment effect (CATE) is defined by (1). Here the expectation is assumed to be
computed at the time the decision is made.
The conditioning here may not be perfect, and there may be some heterogeneity that is
not captured by xi. However, we proceed under the hypothesis that xi is the best information
available at the time a decision is made, and we will be precise in evaluating the quality of
decision making with the CATE relative to a decision that is made with the ATE. At the
time a decision is made the treatment effect is uncertain, with an ex ante probability given
by:
η∗ (x) = Pr
[
u1i − u0i ≥ 0|i ∈ U, xi = x
]
. (2)
As we saw with the example from trials involving anti-depression drugs, the outcome scores
have no cardinal meaning, and hence we suppose that decisions are based only upon an
ordinal ranking of treatments. Heckman (2010) calls this a voting rule, though within the
literature on pattern recognition it is called the optimal Bayes estimator for the best choice:
d∗ (x) =
{
1, if η (x) ≥ 1/2,
0 if not.
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This maximizes the possibility of the “right choice” as opposed to the choice weights, the
outcomes using u1 and u0, given the characteristics xi of individual i.
This perspective provides a natural way to evaluate the quality of choice. Assuming that
we have an optimal decision in hand (or at least it exists conceptually), we can use is to
evaluate the quality of any other decision. Let d : X → {0, 1} be any measurable decision
function, then the Bayes’ risk is defined by:
L (d) = Pr [d(x) 6= d∗ (x)] ,
= µ (x|d (x) 6= d∗ (x)) .
Note that L (d∗) = 0. The Bayes risk provides a measure of how frequently a choice deviates
from the optimal choice. We can define choice for any feasible information set. Suppose Π is
a measurable partition of X - namely ∀A,B ∈ Π, if A 6= B then A∩B = ∅ and X = ∪AA∈Π.
The optimal Bayes rule relative to this information set is:
d∗ (x|Π) = E {d∗ (x) |Π} .
In many contexts, such as in skill acquisition, this is a natural and important concept. For
example, when doing surgery, there will be a complex sequence of steps. A new surgeon
learns not by experimenting with the output (patient survives or not), but by comparing her
choices at each step with the choices of her teacher. As a student, the instructor would be
at her side prompting the next decision.
Theorem 2. Given any decision function d : X → {0, 1} measurable relative to the partition
Π then the Bayes risk satisfies:
L (d∗ (x|Π)) ≤ L (d) .
This result follows from an appropriate modification of Theorem 2.2 in Devroye et al.
(1996).










1, τ (X) ≥ 0,
0 if not.
This is not the only decision rule possible, and it is not necessarily the best rule based
upon the Bayes risk. Specifically, let:
ηATE = E {d∗ (x)} ,
= Pr [d∗ (x) = 1] .
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The optimal decision rule in this case is dATE∗ = d∗ (x|X) = 1 if η (IATE) ≥ 1/2 and zero




) ≤ L (dATE) .
Since there is no a priori assumptions made regarding the distribution of τ (x), then we can
have τ (X) < 0 while ηATE > 1/2. If fact one has immediately the following result:
Proposition 3. The optimal Bayes rule based upon the ATE, dATE∗, has a strictly lower
Bayes risk than a decision based upon the ATE, dATE, if and only if τ (X)
(
ηATE − 1/2) < 0.
This result shows that decision making based upon the ATE may not be optimal in some
cases. For example, suppose that the treatment effect is positive for a X+, and given by
τ+ > 0. While for X− = X − X+, we have τ− < 0. If µ (X+) > µ (X−), and one has to






























The problem is that one cannot determined dATE∗ without information on how d∗ (x) varies
with x. We now turn to this issue.
4 The Human Capital Approach to Inference
This section outlines what I call the human capital approach to inference. The goal is to
provide a way to lever expert knowledge, or human capital, to estimate the CATE. The
standard approach to identify CATE is knowledge of the environment that allows one to
put some structure upon the assignment to treatment groups. The instrumental variables
approach, such as Angrist et al. (1996), assumes that there is some shock in the environment
that creates a random assignment. Vytlacil (2002) and Heckman (2010) observe that the Roy
model can be interpreted as a valid estimate of the returns to changing sectors by viewing
moving costs between sectors as an exogenous shock that is independent of the treatment
effect. Athey and Imbens (2015) discuss the use of machine learning techniques to measure
the CATE, but still rely upon the exogeneity of the treatment effect (as in Theorem 1).
Here I begin with an environment with many heterogeneous units, and at least two (but
not an infinite number of) agents who carry out the assignment to treatments. The precise
context we have in mind is a physician j ∈ J treating patient i ∈ Uj with condition xi. The
set Uj indexes the patients for physician j, with the feature that Uj ∩ Uj′ = ∅ whenever
j 6= j′ and ∪j∈JUj = U . Matters are much easier if we suppose that the distribution of xi
for i ∈ Uj is given by µ for all j ∈ J . This is a strong assumption, and we defer discussion
of it to the end. The job of the physician j is to choose treatment dij ∈ {0, 1} as a function
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of the observable conditions of patient i, given by xi ∈ X. In the spirit of the SUTVA, I
assume that physicians treat “in a bubble.”9 - Epstein and Nicholson (2009) provide some
direct evidence in support of this assumption.
The problem is made more complex by that fact that the number of possible conditions
represented in the set X, is potentially large. The purpose of medical school is to teach
students the best way to treat patients as a function of x ∈ X, so that they make decisions
that are close to optimal, which in our model is represented by d∗ (x).
When we say that this decision making ability is human capital, this has two implications.
The first is that it is expensive to acquire. As I point out in Macleod (2015), this implies
that decision making is imperfect, but increasing with experience and the innate ability of
the individuals. Even highly skilled individuals make mistakes. These errors create random
assignment from which we can learn. The second implication is that even though physicians
make errors, they are not random. Millions of individuals are treated by physicians each
year with the expectation that treatment by a physician is better than the alternative.
This implies that the allocation to a treatment is non-random. We can exploit this fact
and use a basic machine learning algorithm to organize the data before attempting to exploit
error to measure the CATE. More precisely, let us suppose that Agent j ∈ J has an unbiased
noisy observation of the CATE (1):
τij (x) = τ (x) + ij,




, where σ2j > 0 is constant for each doctor. A smaller variance σ2j
corresponds to more human capital. I am assuming that the treatment effect is on a log
scale, so that τ and yi take values on (−∞,∞). If training were perfect and homogeneous,
then we would suppose that σ2j ' 0. We begin with the hypothesis that the quality of
decision making among the j ∈ J Agents varies with the variance σ2j . There is quite a bit of
evidence that this is the case. In the case of physicians, there is a large amount of variation in
practice styles that cannot be explained by the condition of the patient, an observation that
is often used to explain the high cost of health care in the US, along with the under-provision
of care in other cases (Song et al. (2010)).










= {Dataj|j ∈ J} .
With this data we would like to answer two questions. First, do physicians vary in quality
of decision making? Second, what are the features of the better doctors? In particular,
we would like to offer specific guidance on how their decisions might change to improve
outcomes. We begin with the pattern recognition or matching learning approach to thinking
about a decision. Consider physician j. Their job is to divide patients into two groups, X1j
9This is a direct quote from a physician, who said that after medical school his decision making was
independent of other physicians’ decisions.
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and X0j , and then carry out the decision:
dj (xi) =
{
1, xi ∈ X1j ,
0, x ∈ X0j .
What one learns in medical school are patient conditions that delineate sets X1j and X0j -
the problem of pattern recognition is to take the observed data to reconstruct these sets.
The assumption that a doctor observes a noisy signal of the treatment effect dramatically
complicates the problem. Suppose that τ (x) ∈ (−∞,∞), namely for all characteristics
xi ∈ X, the treatment effect is finite then the set of conditions where dj (x) = 1 is given by:
X1j = {x ∈ X|for some i, τij (x) = τ (x) + ij ≥ 0} ,
= X with prob 1, as #U →∞.
In other words with a noisy signal there is always a chance a physician might recommends
di = 1 for any xi ∈ X! Hence, the best we can do is identify the probability that di = 1 as
function of xi.
The solution provided by the human capital approach relies on a few assumptions. First
let us suppose that for a randomly selected individual the probability of using physician j is
ρj. Suppose that for this individual the treatment effect is τ , then the probability of getting
treatment 1 is:



















/σj > 0. (5)
This implies a 1-to-1 relationship between the probability of treatment and the treatment
effect τ . This term is the familiar propensity score. Since the score is strictly increasing with
τ , then it becomes a balancing score in the sense of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), because
conditioning upon e allows for a consistent estimation of τ (x). The first step is to construct
the population propensity score as a function of the data:
η (x) = E [di|xi = x] .
This is connected to the propensity score via η (x) = e (τ (x)). We have:
Proposition 4. Suppose that the SUTVA is satisfied,e′ (τ) > 0 for all τ ∈ <, η (x) =
E {di|xi = x} and η¯ = η(x¯), then if:
τ¯ = E
{
u1i |di = 1, η (xi) = η¯
}− E {u0i |di = 0, η (xi) = η¯} ,
it follows that η (xi) = e (τ¯) for all xi ∈ {x|η (x) = η¯} and τ¯ = τ (xi), the CATE at xi.
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Proof. Under the SUTVA the propensity score is a balancing function, and from theorem 4,
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), τ¯ is the CATE at e (τ¯). The fact that e′ > 0 implies that it
is unique, and hence LATE = τ¯ .
We are making two key assumptions. First, the probability of treatment increases as a
function of τ for each physician, but it is not perfectly correlated. This is the essence of the
human capital approach - we suppose that doctors on average respond correctly to patient
condition. Second we have assumed the allocation of patients to doctors is independent of
the treatment effect. This is not strictly necessary since e′ (τ) is strictly positive. All that is
necessary is that the proportions do not change too quickly with τ .
We can perform some additional robustness checks. In this setup we are assuming that the
physicians are making errors conditional upon the information we have in xi. If that is true,
then if we compare two physicians, and σ2j > σ2j′ , when j′ is a better doctor, her propensity
score rises more quickly. With sufficient data we estimate ηj (x) = η
(
x, σ2j




Agent’s probability of treatment, by restricting the sample to a single agent j. The expected








τ (x) (1− 2ηj (x)) dµ (x)
A simply computation implies:
Proposition 5. The Agent-specific propensity scores and performance satisfy:
∂ηj (x)
∂σj







These results follow immediately from differentiating the respective expressions. Since
ηj (x) = 1/2 iff τ (x) = 0, this implies that for ηj (x) > 1/2, increasing the quality of infor-
mation (lower σj) results in a higher probability of treatment, with the opposite occurring
for ηj (x) < 1/2. Thus the quality of information has an ambiguous effect upon choice. In
contrast, increasing the the quality of information (lower σj) always increases total perfor-
mance.
What we have done is provide some structure to the well known propensity score model
that allows us to interpret a propensity score as a decision rather than a self-selected treat-
ment. The two features of human capital that we exploit are, first, that agents j ∈ J are
skilled, and hence the treatment effect should be monotonic with the propensity score. Sec-
ond, human capital is expensive to acquire, and hence decision making is imperfect, which
in turn implies that conditional upon the propensity score we are observing both potential
outcomes.
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5 Example: Medical Decision Making
The traditional approach in propensity score estimation involves the creation of well defined
groups, within which assignment to treatment and control are independent of individual
characteristics. The idea here is to use the fact that the agents are making decisions to treat
based upon their own perception of the efficacy of treatment. If their decisions are error
free, then we would observe a great deal of homogeneity in their decisions. Moreover, it is
impossible to estimate the treatment effect because we only observe the optimal choice, not
the counter-factual. In this section we discuss two papers that apply these ideas to physician
decision making.
The same framework is used in both papers. In both cases the physician decides whether
or not to treat a patient with an invasive procedure. In the case of heart attack patients this
is angioplasty or catheterization, while in the case of birth it is the choice between a natural
delivery or a C-section. We begin by estimating η (x), the population level probability that
a patient with characteristics xi is treated intensively.10 This can be viewed as a classic
problem in machine learning. Given Data, can we predict what will happen to a patient
with characteristics xi? As it turns out, the standard logit model is a very good and standard
machine learning model.11 We begin by estimating:
ηˆ (xi) = Pr [di = 1] = F (Γxi) , (6)
where di = 1 indicates an invasive procedure, F is the logit function, and Γ is a vector of





where k indicates a patient characteristic. We can then divide patients into two groups -
high and low appropriateness for an invasive procedure:
UH =
{





i ∈ U |ηˆ (xi) ≤ pL
}
,
where pH and pL are chosen to create approximately three groups of individuals of equal
size. In general, the index ηˆ (x) provides a way to rank patients along one dimension based
upon how they are treated in the market.
The next issue is whether or not there is variation in the decisions made by the doctors?
We do this by defining an index of patient condition s (x) by:
ηˆ (x) = F (s (x)) .
For each physician we estimate the individual behavior for i ∈ Uj via:
ηˆj (xi) = Pr [di = 1] = F (αjt + βjts (xi)) , (7)
10In the case of a heart attack patient, an invasive procedure is either angioplasty or catheterization (ICD
codes 00.66, 36.0.., 37.22 or 37.23). For delivery of a child, a c-section is the invasive procedure.
11See Chapter 4, Hastie et al. (2009).
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where {αjt, βjt} is a physician’s practice style at date t. If a physician behaved exactly the
same as his or her colleagues, then the estimated values should not be significantly different
from {0, 1}.
In order to evaluate the effect of practice style upon the patient we construct a measure













where nlj = |Uj ∩ U l| is the number of patients served by physician j in population U l, i ∈
{L,H}. We can then ask if these measures vary systematically with physician practice style.
Notice that an increase in αj leads to more invasive procedures for all patients, while an
increase in βj leads to fewer invasive procedures for low risk patients and more invasive
procedures for high risk patients. Let us now turn to the two applications.
5.1 Heart Attack Treatment
Currie et al. (2016) use hospital discharge data from all heart attack patients in Florida
from 1994 until 2014. The question we ask is whether or not there is variation in physician
decision making quality, and whether or not this is related to outcomes. We restrict the
sample to heart attack patients who arrive at a hospital through the emergency room (ER)
and are treated by a cardiologist. The result is a sample with 658,553 patients (U) treated
by 2,929 cardiologists (J) at 149 hospitals. The set of patient characteristics (X) is listed in
the first column of Table 5.
The index 6 is estimated using the data from teaching hospitals. This helps ensure that
the index is based upon a group of skilled physicians. The patients for whom an invasive
procedure is appropriate (UH) are those with ηˆ (xi) ≥ .66, while the low appropriateness
patients (UL) are those with ηˆ (xi) ≤ .34, The mean values of xik for each group are listed
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.
Next, for each physician j ∈ J , equation (7) is estimated. The first question we address
is whether or not there is evidence that providers deviate significantly from the behavior
of physicians in accredited hospitals. These results are presented in Table 6. We can see
that there is significant deviation from the mean behavior in the market. About 13% of the
physicians are less sensitive to patient conditions than the market mean, while 2% are more
sensitive. The variation in the fixed effect is greater, with about 22% of the sample with a
propensity to treat invasively regardless of the patient condition.
From these results we learn that there is not a consensus on how to treat these patients,
at least for this sample. This variation implies that by comparing the outcomes between
physicians j ∈ J we can learn what treatment styles are more effective because patient
with similar characteristics are receiving different treatments. 7 presents the results from
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Table 5: Patient Characteristics (X)
Appropriateness for Surgery: All Low High
Female 0.40 0.53 0.27
Age 69.91 80.69 59.65
White 0.79 0.83 0.76
Black 0.08 0.07 0.10
Hispanic 0.10 0.08 0.11
Medicaid 0.04 0.02 0.06
Medicare 0.66 0.88 0.38
Private Insurance 0.21 0.07 0.39
Self Pay or Other 0.09 0.03 0.17
Morbidity Index 0.45 -1.33 2.02
Subsequent AMI 0.05 0.12 0.003
#Diagnoses 8.20 8.98 7.16
   Arrhythmia 0.26 0.32 0.20
   Hypertension 0.43 0.33 0.56
   Congestive Heart Failure 0.32 0.51 0.11
   Peripheral Vascular Disease 0.05 0.05 0.04
   Dementia 0.03 0.09 0.00
   Cerebral Vascular Disease 0.07 0.14 0.01
   COPD 0.16 0.20 0.09
   Lupus 0.02 0.03 0.01
   Ulcer 0.01 0.01 0.00
   Liver Disease 0.02 0.03 0.00
   Cancer 0.06 0.10 0.02
   Diabetes 0.21 0.18 0.22
   Kidney Disease 0.15 0.28 0.03
HIV 0.003 0.004 0.002
N 658,553 217,323 223,853
how variation in practice affects various outcomes for high and low appropriateness patients
(versions of equations (8) and (9)). What is interesting is that more aggressive physicians
get better outcomes. Also, low responsiveness physicians get worse outcome for the high
appropriateness patients, while having better outcomes for low appropriateness patients.
Taken together, these results suggest that when judged from a purely medical point of
view, more aggressive treatment of heart attack patients leads to better outcomes. In general
we find that U.S. trained physicians are less responsive and more aggressive, consistent with
getting better medical outcomes. What is interesting is that physicians from top U.S. schools,
while more aggressive, are also more responsive. As one can see from table 5, one of the most
important factors signaling aggressiveness is the age of the patient. Thus, it would seem that
even though invasive procedures improve medical outcomes, for some patients, particularly
older patients, some physicians are choosing to be less aggressive. This is consistent with
them taking into account other factors other than the treatment effect of an intervention.
This illustrates one of the benefits of the human capital approach to measuring the treatment
17
Table 6: Fraction of Estimated Provider Coefficients that are Significantly Different that
β = 1 and α = 0.
Beta<1 Beta=1 Beta>1 Total
Alpha<0 0.028 0.138 0.010 0.176
Alpha=0 0.069 0.527 0.0096 0.606
Alpha>0 0.041 0.177 0.0007 0.219
Total 0.138 0.842 0.020
N= 658,553 patients.
effect because it allows us to learn about other factors that influence a decision, that might
not be apparent if one were to simply do a clinical trial.
5.2 Caesarean Sections
There is a great deal of concern that the C-sections rates in the United States is too high. In
order to help mothers make better decisions, Consumer Consumer Reports (2015) provides
advice on hospital choice, and recommends low C-section hospitals. Implicitly, they are
making two assumptions. The first is that doctors at low-C-section hospitals have uniformly
low C-section rates. While it is mechanically true that choosing a hospital with a low C-
section rate results in a lower rate for the mother, Epstein and Nicholson (2009) find little
relationship on C-section rates between physicians at the same hospital.
Second, the C-section rate recommendations that are used to evaluate physicians and
hospitals assume that it is for a low risk pregnancy. Implicitly it is assumed that physicians
will perform a C-section whenever this is medically necessary. Two questions remain. First,
how should a mother decide if she is low risk or not? Normally, it is the job of the physician
to do this, not the mother. Second, after a physician has been chosen and a preliminary
evaluation has been carried out, there is the issue regarding the quality of decision making
in real time during the labor and delivery process.
Recently, Johnson and Rehavi (2016) find evidence that when the mother is a physician,
then she has a lower C-section rate and gets a better outcome. Given that such a mother
has more medical skill, then we should expect that she chooses physicians more carefully,
and that the physician attending to her will be conscious of the implicit monitoring. In this
case we have both a selection and incentive effect. The next question is whether or not it is
possible to evaluate the quality of physicians?
Currie and MacLeod (2013) do this using the approach described above. They explore
the quality of decision making using information from 1.1 million births in New Jersey from
1997 to 2004. We are able to match these births to 71 hospitals and 5,273 birth attendants.
Since only physicians carry out C-sections we remove the 603 midwives from the sample.
For each delivery we have a rich set of X measures. These are listed in Table 8, along with
the estimated coefficients for equation 6. We run the model for the full sample, as well as
a sample of “good physicians” - those in the bottom 25th percentile of having any adverse
outcomes. One can see that the rankings are very similar, with a correlation of .99.




























































   











   









































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   












































































































































































































the same way. We also know there has been a secular increase in C-section rates over time.
The relationship between our index and the observed C-section rate is illustrated in Figure
1. We can see that there is a strongly positive correlation between our measure of risk of
C-section with observed C-section rates. Also, the Figure documents the upward shift in
C-section rates for all mothers, though the largest increase occurs in the 0.5 to 0.9 region.
Given the changes over time, we allow estimated physician practice style to vary with time.
Figure 1: Shifts in Probability of a C-Section Over Time
The next question is whether physicians vary systematically in the way they treat pa-
tients. In Currie and MacLeod (2013) we provide a formal model of physician decisions that
provides a structural interpretation of equation 7. Specifically, physicians who are better
at diagnosis have a higher βjt. This is the case under the hypothesis that the index we
construct accurately ranks patients, and that physicians make errors in their evaluation of
patient condition. We will be able to check this hypothesis by seeing if variation in βjt is
associated with variation in outcomes, as predicted by Proposition 4. An alternative hy-
pothesis is that the physicians have better information than we have as outside observers. In
that case we would expect the reverse – an increase in βjt implies less private information,
and hence worse outcomes. As we shall see, the data rejects this alternative hypothesis.
In addition, we measure procedural skill by calculating the rate of any bad outcomes
among very low risk births, and the rate of bad outcomes among high risk births for each
doctor, and then taking the difference between them. Taking the difference in the incidence
of bad outcomes between these two groups is suggested by the model, in which it is the
difference in skill in procedure C and in procedure N that affects the physician’s choice. The
rate of bad outcomes in each group proxies for surgical skill because the vast majority of
high-risk women get C-sections and most very low-risk women do not. At the same time,
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because the very high-risk and very low-risk groups are defined only in terms of underlying
medical risk factors, the measure is not contaminated by the endogeneity of the actual choice
of C-section within these risk categories. This measure also exhibits considerable variation
between doctors with a mean of -0.0493 (given that bad outcomes are more frequent in high
risk cases than in low risk cases) and a standard deviation of 0.0646. The first percentile of
this variable is -0.25, while the 99th percentile is 0.079. Again, we normalize this measure
by calculating a Z-score for ease of interpretation.
The effects of decision making skill (from the estimated βjt in 7) and our measure of
procedural skill are presented in Table 9. The top part of the table reports the results of
skill upon C-section rates. TSLS refers to our two-stage least squares estimates that control
for selection of patients to physicians at the market level. Notice that an increase in decision
making skills leads to higher C-sections for the high risk patients, while it reduces the rate
for low risk patients. More importantly, the effect of decision making skill has a zero average
effect. This is important because most of the public policy concern has been with the high
C-section rates, and not upon the quality of decision making.
The effect of decision making quality of the physician is reported in the lower part of
the table. Notice that performance increases for both the high risk and the low risk groups.
In other words, an increase in C-section rates for the high risk patients results in better
outcomes. This effect is different than procedural skill, which mainly affects the level of
C-sections via the αj term in physician quality. We can see this because an increase in
procedural skill increases the C-section rate for both high and low risk patients. However,
in the lower panel we see that outcomes improve for both risk categories.
Our earlier work, Currie and MacLeod (2008), found strong and consistent effects of
tort reform upon outcomes, consistent with the hypothesis that a C-section is not risk free,
and that physicians respond to financial incentives. These results are consistent with a long
literature in health economics illustrating the relationship between financial incentives and
procedure choice (e.g. Gruber and Owings (1996)). However, for the better physicians,
the effect of these reforms were close to zero, consistent with our hypothesis that there are
variations in physician quality, and that the better physicians are not affected by tort law
(nor should they be - in the U.S. medical liability is a negligence regime, and hence only
negligent physicians should respond to changes in the law).
More importantly, these results illustrate the role that diagnosis plays in determining
patient outcomes, and that there is not a one size fits all approach for determining C-sections.
We find that for low risk mothers the C-section rate is too high relative to the medically
optimal level, while for high risk mothers it is too low. Currie and MacLeod (2013) conclude
by observing:
Taking the model to data on C-sections, the most common surgical proce-
dure performed in the U.S., we show that improving diagnostic skills from the
25th to the 75th percentile of the observed distribution would reduce C-section
rates by 11.7% among the low risk, and increase them by 3.8% among the high
risk. Since in our application there are many more low risk women than high
risk women, improving diagnosis would reduce overall C-section rates without
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depriving high risk women of necessary care. Moreover, we show that an in-
crease in diagnostic skill would improve health outcomes for both high risk and
low risk women, while improvements in surgical skill have much larger effects on
high risk women. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that improv-
ing diagnosis through methods such as checklists, computer assisted diagnosis,
and collaborative decision making could reduce unnecessary procedure use and
improve health outcomes.
6 Conclusions
The paper outlines a human capital approach to inference with the goal of measuring the
treatment effect of choice in situations where it is not possible or practical to carry out trials
of sufficient precision. The example I use here is the problem of medical decision making.
The underlying variation in human populations means that it is rarely the case that the
choice of treatment, whether it is a drug or surgical procedure, will have a homogenous
effects across the population at risk. For example, the same drug can be life saving for one
person, while lethal for another.
The human capital approach begins with the hypothesis that we can use the decisions of
experts to organize individuals into treatment groups that have similar characteristics, and
hence the treatment effect within these groups is more homogeneous. Here machine learning
techniques can be very useful because of their potential to categorize large amounts of data
efficiently.
Second, even though experts are skilled, they necessarily make mistakes. Without mis-
takes there can be no learning - a randomized control trial is an extreme case of learning by
forced randomization over possible treatments. In the context of physician decision making
we can measure the variation in decision making, from which we can assess which physicians
are getting better outcomes, which in turn allows us to evaluate the effect of treatment.
Third, the analysis illustrates a situation where the average treatment effect is not nec-
essarily useful because it averages over a group of units where the treatment effect is both
positive and negative. The machine learning approach focuses upon the quality of the de-
cision making rather than the average value of a decision. In the case of a binary choice,
when the expected value of the optimal decision is between 0 and 1, then we know we are
in a situation with heterogeneous treatment effects.
This observation can help us interpret our findings. In the case of heart attack patients,
Currie et al. (2016) find that the optimal choice from a medical point of view is to provide
all patients with an invasive procedure. However, our results identify some systematic het-
erogeneity in treatment among patients. In particular, physicians from better hospitals tend
to be more responsive – namely, they are less likely to do an invasive procedure for low ap-
propriateness patients, which in practice corresponds to older patients (see Table A1). This
is consistent with the hypothesis that physicians are sensitive to other factors than simply
medical necessity when making their decisions.
In the case of child birth, Currie et al. (2016) find that there is a great deal of heterogeneity
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in the decision to perform a C-section. It is widely believed that some of this heterogeneity is
due to financial incentives that lead to excessively high C-section rates in the United States.12
We found this to be the case for low risk births. However, in the case of high risk births
the C-section rate is too low. When we average over the two groups, and take into account
the number of women at risk, we find that the mean C-section rate in New Jersey is too
low relative to the medically optimal rate. This provides another example of the problem
with looking at the average treatment effect, which can mask significant heterogeneity in the
optimal treatment choice.
Much more work is needed to explore the robustness of these results. However, the case
of C-sections does illustrate an important public policy issue where more work is needed to
link measured treatment effects to policy recommendation, a point that Heckman and Smith
(1995) and Dehejia (2005) have already emphasized in the case of program evaluation. The
finding in Currie et al. (2016) that average C-section rates are too low in New Jersey is
consistent with recent work by Molina et al. (2015) who look at C-section rates world wide.
They find that the WHO guidelines of 10%-15% C-section rates to be too low, and that
19% may be a more appropriate norm. However, as D’Alton and Hehir (2015) point out in
their discussion of this paper, whether or not to have a C-section should be based upon high
quality information. Not only should the C-section incidence vary with the characteristics of
the mother, it should also vary with the characteristics of the physicians, and characteristics
of the hospital where child delivery is occurring.
These examples provide concrete illustrations of what Deaton (2010) calls the well known
“heterogeneity problem.” The contribution of the human capital approach is to provide one
way to combine structure with randomization, as recommended by Heckman (2010). Decision
making by the expert provides structure to organizing patients into groups in a way that
is analogous to the propensity score method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Once we
condition upon best practice as perceived by the expert, then one can identify the condition
treatment effect under the hypothesis that even experts make mistakes. We can exploit the
variation in errors rates between experts to learn what strategies works best.
Finally, I point out the well known fact that randomized control trials of drugs for treating
depression are very inadequate. As Frank and McGuire (2000) point out, the problems with
health delivery physical illness are all magnified when it comes to mental health. Given that
there is little understanding on when a particular drug will work for a patient, treatment
often involves psychiatrists doing their own mini-trials with each patient, and then adjusting
medication as a function of the outcome. The starting point for treatment is typically
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. What it does is attempt parse
information about each patient, xi, into categories, such “Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other
Psychotic Disorders” or “Bipolar and Related Disorders”. For each category there will be
recommended treatments that are used as starting points. The DSM is careful to point out
that these categories are not always definitive and that finding the right treatment can be
difficult. At the moment it is simply not possible to apply something like the human capital
approach to mental illness due to a lack of data. However, if there were large scale systematic
12See Gruber and Owings (1996) and Consumer Consumer Reports (2015).
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collection of data on individuals treated with mental illness, then progress could be made.
It is worth emphasizing that the approach here is a bit different from the typical machine
learning strategy. For example, supervised learning of an algorithm begins with a train-
ing set produced by experts to “teach” the algorithm about what are the best decisions in
certain situations. Once trained, one can test the algorithm out of sample (see Athey and
Imbens (2015) for an explicit application of these ideas to estimating the conditional average
treatment effect).
The approach suggested here combines the wisdom of experts to characterize sub-populations
with the fact that experts do make mistakes (Kahneman and Klein (2009)). Rather than
sample only the best decision makers, the human capital approach suggests using a large
sample with many decision makers to generate variation in decisions over sub-populations of
the treatment unit. This allows us to estimate the conditional average treatment effect for
finer sub-populations than would be possible with structured randomized control trials. Of
course, much work remains to refine the approach, and explore the extent to which “learning
from our mistakes” can be automated to help improve decision making.
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Table 8: Estimation of η (x).
              All Doctors                   Good Doctors Only     
Marginal Marginal
Coeff. S.E. Effect Coeff. S.E. Effect
Age<20 -0.337 0.013 -0.075 -0.428 0.029 -0.095
Age >=25&<30 0.262 0.008 0.058 0.311 0.018 0.069
Age >=30&<35 0.434 0.008 0.096 0.483 0.017 0.107
Age >=35 0.739 0.009 0.164 0.840 0.018 0.186
2nd Birth -1.347 0.007 -0.298 -1.448 0.015 -0.321
3rd Birth -1.645 0.009 -0.364 -1.787 0.019 -0.396
4th or Higher Birth -2.140 0.012 -0.474 -2.317 0.027 -0.513
Previous C-section 3.660 0.008 0.810 3.885 0.018 0.860
Previous Large Infant 0.139 0.029 0.031 0.293 0.065 0.065
Previous Preterm -0.293 0.025 -0.065 -0.311 0.061 -0.069
Multiple Birth 2.879 0.014 0.638 3.278 0.032 0.726
Breech 3.353 0.016 0.742 3.810 0.040 0.844
Placenta Previa 3.811 0.054 0.844 3.843 0.116 0.851
Abruptio Placenta 2.048 0.030 0.454 2.196 0.072 0.486
Cord Prolapse 1.761 0.047 0.390 1.668 0.100 0.369
Uterine Bleeding 0.026 0.035 0.006 0.259 0.099 0.057
Eclampsia 1.486 0.096 0.329 1.047 0.230 0.232
Chronic Hypertension 0.745 0.025 0.165 0.754 0.060 0.167
Pregnancy Hypertension 0.639 0.013 0.142 0.696 0.029 0.154
Chronic Lung Condition 0.064 0.014 0.014 0.110 0.032 0.024
Cardiac Condition -0.121 0.020 -0.027 -0.175 0.042 -0.039
Diabetes 0.558 0.011 0.124 0.547 0.025 0.121
Anemia 0.131 0.018 0.029 0.203 0.043 0.045
Hemoglobinopathy 0.116 0.047 0.026 0.067 0.092 0.015
Herpes 0.461 0.024 0.102 0.558 0.049 0.124
Other STD 0.052 0.017 0.012 0.064 0.039 0.014
Hydramnios 0.616 0.018 0.136 0.645 0.042 0.143
Incompetent Cervix 0.043 0.035 0.010 -0.119 0.093 -0.026
Renal Disease -0.024 0.031 -0.005 -0.057 0.067 -0.013
Rh Sensitivity -0.045 0.040 -0.010 -0.082 0.109 -0.018
Other Risk Factor 0.276 0.006 0.061 0.210 0.013 0.047
Constant -1.414 0.007 -0.313 -1.374 0.015 -0.304
# Observations 1169654 262174
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.322
Notes: The model also included indicators for missing age, parity, and risk factors. The
correlation between rho estimated using the two different models is .99.
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Table 9: Effect of Doctor Physician Making and Surgical Skill on P(C-section) and Health
Outcomes
OLS OLS OLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
                    C-section Risk: All Low High All Low High
Dep. Var: C-Section
Decision Making 0.004 -0.011 0.019 0.000 -0.016 0.019
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Procedural Skill Difference 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.020 0.017 0.030
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
R-sq/Chi-sq. 0.410 0.044 0.319 230000 12674 88123
Dep. Var: Any Bad Outcome
Decision Making -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Procedural Skill Difference -0.017 -0.008 -0.027 -0.058 -0.047 -0.072
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
R-sq/Chi-sq. 0.020 0.016 0.023 6600 13213 1721
# Observations 968748 469170 499578 968748 469170 499578
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the 3-digit zip code level. Regressions also include mar-
ket price, estimated C-section risk, indicators for African-American, Hispanics, race missing,
education (less than high school, high school, some college, missing), married, married miss-
ing, Medicaid, Medicaid missing, teen mom, 25-34, 35 plus, smoking, smoking missing, male
child, parity 2, parity 3, parity 4 plus, parity missing, month and year of birth indicators,
indicators for 3-digit zip code, and an indicator for whether the birth was on a week day.
R-squared shown for OLS and Chi-squared shown for TSLS.
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